The Meeting Behind The U.S. Banking Crisis
I’d heard about it a couple of times before: the infamous April 2004 meeting between the Securities and Exchange Commission and the big investment banks which, supposedly, is a major contributing factor to the ongoing U.S. banking crisis. Thankfully, Stephen Labaton of the New York Times heard about the meeting as well, and wrote in early October:
Many events in Washington, on Wall Street and elsewhere around the country have led to what has been called the most serious financial crisis since the 1930s. But decisions made at a brief meeting on April 28, 2004, explain why the problems could spin out of control. The agency’s failure to follow through on those decisions also explains why Washington regulators did not see what was coming.
On that bright spring afternoon, the five members of the Securities and Exchange Commission met in a basement hearing room to consider an urgent plea by the big investment banks.
They wanted an exemption for their brokerage units from an old regulation that limited the amount of debt they could take on. The exemption would unshackle billions of dollars held in reserve as a cushion against losses on their investments. Those funds could then flow up to the parent company, enabling it to invest in the fast-growing but opaque world of mortgage-backed securities; credit derivatives, a form of insurance for bond holders; and other exotic instruments.
The five investment banks led the charge, including Goldman Sachs, which was headed by Henry M. Paulson Jr. Two years later, he left to become Treasury secretary.
A lone dissenter — a software consultant and expert on risk management — weighed in from Indiana with a two-page letter to warn the commission that the move was a grave mistake. He never heard back from Washington…
The proceeding was sparsely attended. None of the major media outlets, including The New York Times, covered it.
After 55 minutes of discussion, which can now be heard on the Web sites of the agency and The Times, the chairman, William H. Donaldson, a veteran Wall Street executive, called for a vote. It was unanimous. The decision, changing what was known as the net capital rule, was completed and published in The Federal Register a few months later.
With that, the five big independent investment firms were unleashed.
… and the rest is history. Labaton explained:
Over the following months and years, each of the firms would take advantage of the looser rules. At Bear Stearns, the leverage ratio — a measurement of how much the firm was borrowing compared to its total assets — rose sharply, to 33 to 1. In other words, for every dollar in equity, it had $33 of debt. The ratios at the other firms also rose significantly.
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Leverage Ratios For
Major U.S. Investment Banks
2003-2007
The outcome? The end of the U.S. investment banking era. From UPI on September 22:
The U.S. Federal Reserve ended an era on Wall Street Sunday, agreeing to allow two investment banks to change structure to become bank holding companies.
Morgan Stanley (NYSE:MS) and Goldman Sachs, the remaining two large U.S. investment banks, requested the change, which gives them greater access to federal lending but additional regulatory oversight.
Previously regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the two investment giants will now have restrictions akin to those placed on commercial banks, The New York Times (NYSE:NYT) reported Monday.
The other three large Wall Street investment banks met separate fates over the past six months. Bear Stearns (NYSE:BSC) collapsed in March and was bought by J.P. Morgan and Chase Co (AMEX:CCF) with help of a $30 billion federal loan. Last Monday, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (NYSE:LEH), filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and Bank of American purchased the third — Merrill Lynch (NYSE:MER) — for $50 billion.
Meanwhile, while all of this was taking place, the Securities and Exchange Commission, under Chairman Christopher Cox, were nowhere to be seen. Labaton wrote:
In loosening the capital rules, which are supposed to provide a buffer in turbulent times, the agency also decided to rely on the firms’ own computer models for determining the riskiness of investments, essentially outsourcing the job of monitoring risk to the banks themselves…
The 2004 decision for the first time gave the S.E.C. a window on the banks’ increasingly risky investments in mortgage-related securities.
But the agency never took true advantage of that part of the bargain. The supervisory program under Mr. Cox, who arrived at the agency a year later, was a low priority.
The commission assigned seven people to examine the parent companies — which last year controlled financial empires with combined assets of more than $4 trillion. Since March 2007, the office has not had a director. And as of last month, the office had not completed a single inspection since it was reshuffled by Mr. Cox more than a year and a half ago…
Last Friday, the commission formally ended the 2004 program, acknowledging that it had failed to anticipate the problems at Bear Stearns and the four other major investment banks.
“The last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not work,” Mr. Cox said.
Try crystal clear. Reporting on the program’s termination, Reuters’ Rachelle Younglai wrote on September 26:
“Sadly, this is the absolutely classic case of locking the barn door after the horse has been stolen,” said John Coffee, a professor at Columbia Law School. “They have belatedly recognized (at least the inspector general) that the consolidated supervised entity program was not working as intended and that a case for strict leverage ratios needs to be recognized.”
Too bad the “big five” U.S. investment banks are no longer around to heed such advice.
Sources:
“Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt “
Stephen Labaton
New York Times, October 3, 2008
“U.S. investment banking era ends”
United Press International, September 22, 2008
“UPDATE 2-US SEC’s watchdog faults investment bank oversight”
Rachelle Younglai
Reuters, September 26, 2008














